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Antitrust Exemptions for Private
Requests for Governmental Action: A
Critical Analysis of the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine
Earl W. Kintner* and Joseph P. Bauer**
INTRODUCTION'
Section 1 of. the Sherman Act makes it unlawful for persons to en-
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This Article is an advance version of a chapter in Volume VIII of the treatise Fed-
eral Antitrust Law by Earl W. Kintner and Joseph P. Bauer, published by Anderson
Publishing Co. All rights reserved. The authors would like to thank Ms. Annie Eies-
land for her assistance in the preparation of this Article. A review of the first two
volumes of this treatise appears, inter alia, at 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 521 (1981).
' A number of articles and notes have addressed this topic. In addition to those com-
mentaries cited infra notes 65, 85, see, e.g., Baker, Exchange of Information for Pres-
entation to Government Agencies: The Interplay of the Container and Noerr Doctrines,
44 ANTITRUST L.J. 354 (1975); Bern, The Noerr-Pennington Immunity for Petitioning
in Light of City of Lafayette's Restriction on the State Action Inmunity, 1980 ARIz.
ST. L.J. 279; Bien, Litigation as an Antitrust Violation: Conflict Between the First
Amendment and the Sherman Act, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 41 (1981); Cockerill, Application
of Noerr-Pennington and the First Amendment to Politically Motivated Economic Boy-
cotts: Missouri v. NOW, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 85 (1979); Costilo, Antitrust's Newest
Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MICH. L. REV. 333 (1967); Crawford
& Tschoepe, The Erosion of the Noerr-Pennington Immunity, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 291
(1981); Donelan, Noerr-Pennington Trials: Practical Problems for the Offense, 46 AN-
TITRUST L.J. 737 (1977); Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Govern-
ment Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 80 (1977); Hibner, Litigation as an Overt Act - Development and Prognosis, 46
ANTITRUST L.J. 718 (1977); Hibner, Litigation as an Overt Act in Furtherance of an
Attempt to Monopolize, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 245 (1977); Higginbotham, The Noerr-Pen-
nington Problem: A View From the Bench, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 730 (1977); Howe, The
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and Inroads Into It - Recent Supreme Court Decisions
and Some Guidelines for Trade Association Activity, 26 MERCER L. REV. 527 (1975);
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gage in a "combination . . .or conspiracy, in restraint of trade."2 A
variety of undertakings by persons seeking legislative action, judicial
relief, administrative agency activity, or action by the executive branch
of government may result in governmental steps which restrain compet-
itors or diminish competition. Indeed, the very act of seeking govern-
mental intervention, even if unsuccessful, may have adverse competitive
effects. Similarly, "monopolization or attempts to monopolize," pro-
scribed by section 2 of the Sherman Act,3 might actually be advanced
by governmental activities or by an individual merely seeking govern-
mental assistance. Other provisions of the antitrust laws may also in-
volve or be advanced by governmental intervention and private requests
for such assistance.
Although such conduct may raise competitive concerns, petitions by
individuals or groups of individuals for governmental action or inter-
vention implicate other important political and constitutional values. In
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,'
the seminal decision dealing with the interface of antitrust prohibitions
and the right to seek governmental relief, the Supreme Court identified
Kennedy, Political Boycotts, the Sherman Act, and the First Amendment: An Accommo-
dation of Competing Interests, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 983, 993-1006 (1982); McMahon,
Recent Significant Developments in "State Action" and Noerr-Pennington Exemptions:
From Boulder to the "Sham" Exception, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 531 (1983); Miller,
Antitrust and Certificate of Need: Health Systems Agencies, the Planning Act, and
Regulatory Capture, 68 Gwo. L.J. 873, 900-18 (1980); White, Participant Govern-
mental Action Immunity from the Antitrust Laws: Fact or Fiction?, 50 TEX. L. REV.
474 (1972); Comment, Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity and Proprietary Govern-
ment Activity, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 749; Comment, Antitrust Immunity: Recent Excep-
tions to the Noerr-Pennington Defense, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1133 (1971);
Note, Physician Influence: Applying Noerr-Pennington to the Medical Profession, 1978
DUKE L.J. 701; Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immunity for Concerted Attempts to In-
fluence Courts and Adjudicatory Agencies: Analogies to Malicious Prosecution and
Abuse of Process, 86 HARV. L. REV. 715 (1973); Note, Application of the Sherman Act
to Attempts to Influence Government Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 847 (1968); Note, The
Quagmire Thickens: A Post-California Motor View of the Antitrust and Constitutional
Ramifications of Petitioning the Government, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 281 (1973); 57 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 518 (1969); 62 CORNELL L. REV. 628 (1977); 56 NOTRE DAME LAW.
326 (1980); 33 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 413 (1961); 30 VAND. L. REV. 75 (1977); 20
WASHBURN L.J. 130 (1980); see also I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
201-206 (1978).
' 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See generally II E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
chs. 9-10 (1980).
' 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See generally II E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
chs. 11-14 (1980).
4 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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the various reasons why private requests for such action are generally
immunized from challenge under the antitrust laws. First, permitting
an antitrust action to be predicated on private requests for governmen-
tal action would impair the government's ability to function. In a rep-
resentative democracy, the government is acting on behalf of its citizens
and must know what they believe would best serve their interests.
Therefore, it is important that these channels of communication be kept
open and encouraged.' Second, prohibiting private requests would raise
serious constitutional questions. The first amendment protects freedom
of speech and the right to petition governmental officials. Even if Con-
gress had sought to limit these constitutional rights when it enacted the
Sherman Act in 1890,6 the permissibility of this purpose would be
doubtful.7 Third, the Noerr Court inferred a contrary legislative intent.
Congress did not want to extend the antitrust laws to reach conduct of
In a representative democracy such as this, these branches of government
act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of
representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes
known to their representatives. To hold that the government retains the
power to act in this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same time,
that the people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes would
impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but
political activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever in the
legislative history of that Act.
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137 (footnote omitted).
' Sherman Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209.
' "[S]uch a construction of the Sherman Act would raise important constitutional
questions. The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights,
and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these free-
doms." Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138.
The Noerr Court, however, expressly declined to rest its decision on the first amend-
ment; instead, its conclusion was based solely on construction of the Sherman Act. Id.
at 132 n.6. Recent cases have suggested a more substantial constitutional imperative in
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See, e.g., Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,
103 S. Ct. 2161, 2169 (1983) ("the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First
Amendment right to petition the Government"); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 399 n.17 (1978). Whether the exemption is statutorily or
constitutionally based is of some significance. If the basis is constitutional, courts con-
struing Noerr-Pennington would look to the underlying policies of the first amendment
and the many decisions interpreting it. If, on the other hand, the basis is statutory,
several conclusions would flow. First, the exemption could be broader than (although
presumably not narrower than) the limits compelled by the first amendment. Second,
one of the sources in reaching a decision would be the intention of the drafters of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. Thus, courts would look to the goals and the policies of the
antitrust laws in reconciling the conflicting interests.
1984]
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a distinctly political nature
On the other hand, reconciliation of these potentially conflicting val-
ues - freedom to compete versus freedom of association and freedom to
petition the government9 - does not require that all prayers for gov-
ernmental action be immunized. Implicit in the notion that persons
must be free to seek governmental action is the understanding that im-
proper means will not be used to deny that same right to others. Fur-
thermore, when appeals for government action are based on falsehoods
or assert frivolous claims, the petitioner is not truly attempting to exer-
cise the "right of petition." 10 Therefore, the Court has recognized that
the antitrust laws will not be displaced when persons are merely using
their right to petition as a subterfuge to prevent others from having
access to government officials or to prevent the government from taking
any action. Similarly, certain forms of obtaining governmental action,
such as bribery of a public official, perjury of witnesses, or active fraud,
are so far removed from accepted channels as to fall outside the de-
scribed immunity.
Having sketched the broad contours of these competing sets of values,
8 Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution in legislating with re-
spect to problems relating to the conduct of political activities, a caution
which has been reflected in the decisions of this Court interpreting such
legislation. All of this caution would go for naught if we permitted an ex-
tension of the Sherman Act to regulate activities of that nature simply be-
cause those activities have a commercial impact and involve conduct that
can be termed unethical.
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 141 (footnote omitted).
The Court also pointed to the essential dissimilarity between conspiracies to seek
legislation or law enforcement and such traditional conspiracies as price-fixing agree-
ments, group boycotts, or market division agreements. While the latter are character-
ized by an understanding that the parties will give up their trade freedom or will help
one another take away the trade freedom of third parties, the former are not agree-
ments in the traditional Sherman Act meaning of that term. See also Missouri v. Na-
tional Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1312 (8th Cir.) (Sherman Act particularly
inapplicable when defendants sought social rather than commercial legislation), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); Smith v. McDonald, 562 F. Supp. 829, 838 (M.D.N.C.
1983) (Noerr-Pennington elevates right of petition over Sherman Act regulation of bus-
iness activities).
' Cf Costello Publishing Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035, 1048-50 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(in action challenging alleged anticompetitive activities of religious organization, conflict
between values of competition and protection of first amendment freedom of religion
held to raise considerations similar to those in Noerr), noted in 57 NOTRE DAME LAW.
828 (1982).
10 Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2161, 2170 (1983) ("Just as
false statements are not immunized by the First Amendment right of freedom of speech,
• . . baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition.").
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
however, certain problems in application of these principles arise. The
first problem is a practical one, which involves difficult factual determi-
nations. When is the defendant's conduct a mere sham of true govern-
mental petitioning? When is the activity so far beyond the pale of ac-
cepted methods of seeking official relief that the antitrust laws ought to
continue to apply? The second problem involves the articulated recon-
ciliation of these values, and the conceptual inconsistencies that arise.
As will be discussed below, the Noerr Court suggested that the defen-
dant's intent was irrelevant. It held that the antitrust laws would not
apply even if the defendant could reasonably anticipate that its conduct
would injure competitors; the right to petition prevailed over the ad-
verse competitive impact. Given this statement, it is difficult to under-
stand why this right would not also prevail in the sham petition situa-
tion. Therefore, subsequent decisions have looked to the defendant's
intent in determining the availability of this immunity. Additionally,
although the individual right to petition deserves protection, it is not
equally clear that the first amendment and its associated values require
that persons be allowed to act jointly in a "combination or conspiracy"
to seek such relief, nor why the immunity should extend to activities
ancillary to the basic petitioning process. The first amendment yields to
antitrust norms in other areas. For example, price fixing is unlawful
per se, even if it is the result of "speech" between the parties to the
agreement. The Court need not have concluded that concerted political
speech, even of an anticompetitive nature, is entitled to broad
immunity.
This Article will assess the present state of the law in this area, fo-
cusing on judicial attempts to resolve these thorny questions. Part I
summarizes the development of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and
subsequent judicial limitations. Part II considers the applicability of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine to various agencies. Part III discusses
whether certain methods of petitioning the government fall outside the
exemption and the extent to which that exemption is dependent on the
type of governmental body being petitioned. Part IV focuses on the
most frequently litigated exception, the sham petition. Part V analyzes
the special problems posed by these cases and proposes suggestions for
resolution.
19841
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I. JUDICIAL ORIGIN OF THE EXEMPTION: THE Noerr AND
Pennington DECISIONS
Prior to the Court's seminal decision in Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.," application of the antitrust
laws to political activity had been raised in a number of decisions. 2 Yet
in Noerr, the Court recognized that the particular issue of immunity
from antitrust liability for private requests for governmental action, ei-
ther individual or concerted, presented "a new and unusual application
of the Sherman Act."1 3
The Noerr decision arose out of a struggle between the trucking and
railroad industries for a greater share of the long-distance freight busi-
ness. An association of railroads had engaged in a successful publicity
campaign designed to foster legislative and executive action to block
passage of state legislation favorable to the truckers, and to enforce ex-
isting statutes applicable to the trucking industry. In the principal law-
suit, the truckers alleged that the defendant railroads, in an effort to
monopolize the long-haul freight business, had violated sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act by conspiring to lessen the plaintiffs' ability to
compete fairly. Two grounds of illegality were alleged: that the cam-
paign was characterized by the railroads' anticompetitive intent to in-
jure the truckers and diminish public goodwill toward the truckers as
significant competitors, and that the defendants' conduct was fraudulent
and deceptive."'
The Court's opinion first identified the conflict between the goals of
" 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
12 The Noerr Court cited United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533 (1939),
and Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), for the proposition that when "a restraint
upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to
private action, no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be made out." Noerr, 365 U.S. at
136.
11 365 U.S. at 135. Since the current law in this area is based solely on Noerr and its
progeny, this Article will not discuss its judicial antecedents.
" The principal deceptive practice was the use of the "third party technique."
"[Tihe publicity matter circulated in the campaign was made to appear as spontane-
ously expressed views of independent persons and civic groups when, in fact, it was
large!y prepared and produced by [defendants' public relations firm] and paid for by
the railroads." Id. at 130.
[Tihe third-party technique, which was aptly characterized by the District
Court as involving "deception of the public, manufacture of bogus sources
of reference, [and] distortion of public sources of information," depends
upon giving propaganda actually circulated by a party in interest the ap-
pearance of being spontaneous declarations of independent groups.
Id. at 140.
[Vol. 17:549
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
the antitrust laws and the values inherent in political and constitutional
activity. The decision enumerated the political considerations that mili-
tated against application of the antitrust laws to private requests for
governmental action.'5 The Court concluded that the antitrust laws do
not make most of these political activities unlawful, including those of a
concerted nature in which the result may be a significant lessening of
competition or injury to competitors.
The Court then addressed the two grounds that might have led to
illegality. First, the Court held that the defendants' anticompetitive mo-
tive or intent in seeking passage of new legislation and enforcement of
existing laws was irrelevant. 6 Individuals seek governmental action or
intervention most frequently in situations involving financial benefit to
them. It is not unexpected that in the course of such importuning they
will seek some advantage, and concomitantly will seek to disadvantage
their competitors.'7 Second, mere resort to unethical tactics in the
course of a publicity campaign designed to inform and influence public
officials does not make otherwise sheltered activity unlawful. The Sher-
man Act regulates business activities and trade restraints, not political
activity; it would be inappropriate to use the antitrust laws to attempt
to control political behavior. 8 The Court also observed that even if the
defendants' conduct did in fact injure the plaintiffs by weakening their
competitive standing, the antitrust laws still would not apply. Such in-
jury is the necessary but unavoidable result of legitimate political
activity. "
" See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
,6 "[Tlhe fact ... that the railroads' sole purpose in seeking to influence the pas-
sage and enforcement of laws was to destroy the truckers as competitors for the long-
distance freight business . . . could [not] transform conduct otherwise lawful into a
violation of the Sherman Act." 365 U.S. at 138-39 (footnotes omitted).
1, Id. at 139.
to Insofar as [the Sherman] Act sets up a code of ethics at all, it is a code that
condemns trade restraints, not political activity, and, as we have already
pointed out, a publicity campaign to influence governmental action falls
clearly into the category of political activity. The proscriptions of the Act,
tailored as they are for the business world, are not at all appropriate for
application in the political arena.
Id. at 140-41.
I It is inevitable, whenever an attempt is made to influence legislation by a
campaign of publicity, that an incidental effect of that campaign may be
the infliction of some direct injury upon the interests of the party against
whom the campaign is directed. And it seems equally inevitable that those
conducting the campaign would be aware of, and possibly even pleased by,
the prospect of such injury. To hold that the knowing infliction of such
injury renders the campaign itself illegal would thus be tantamount to out-
1984]
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The Court did suggest, however, that the right to seek governmental
action might be subject to some exception. Had the publicity campaign
been a mere sham to cover anticompetitive activities, the antitrust laws
would apply." But in Noerr, the defendants' acts did not fall outside
the basic immunity principle. The fleshing out of this exception, as well
as the identification of other exceptions, had to await subsequent case
law.
The next Supreme Court decision to treat this area, United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington,' put a slight gloss on the Noerr
doctrine. Labor union officials and the operators of certain large firms
in the coal industry jointly approached the Secretary of Labor and offi-
cials of the Tennessee Valley Authority, an autonomous federal agency.
They successfully obtained establishment of a minimum wage in the
industry and the curtailing of certain purchases in the market. Evidence
revealed that these decisions had an adverse effect on many of the
smaller companies in the industry, which as a result of these govern-
mental decisions were unable to compete successfully. The operator of
one smaller company alleged that these approaches to government offi-
cials resulted in a restraint of trade and injury to competition in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court held, however, that the
defendants' motive or purpose was irrelevant in determining whether
the antitrust laws applied. Regardless of either anticompetitive intent or
effect, this conduct was absolutely immune from Sherman Act
scrutiny.22
The Pennington decision seemed to harden the Court's preference
for first amendment values. By suggesting that the defendants' purpose
or intent never mattered, it seemed to limit dramatically exceptions to
the primacy of the right to petition over the proscriptions of the anti-
trust laws. Subsequent decisions, however, reveal some weakening of
lawing all such campaigns. We have already discussed the reasons which
have led us to the conclusion that this has not been done by anything in
the Sherman Act.
Id. at 143-44.
20 "There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed to-
ward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing
more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competi-
tor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified." Id. at 144.
21 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
22 "Nothing could be clearer from the Court's opinion [in Noerr] than that anticom-
petitive purpose did not illegalize the conduct there involved. . . . Noerr shields from
the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or
purpose." Id. at 669-70.
[Vol. 17:549
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the basic Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Subsequent to its articulation of the basic doctrine in the Noerr and
Pennington decisions, the Supreme Court has had several occasions to
give further consideration to the reconciliation of antitrust and political-
constitutional concerns. In addition, the lower federal courts have had
many opportunities to grapple with the various nuances of these
problems.
The most significant Supreme Court decision in this area is Califor-
nia Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.23 The Court had al-
ready suggested in Noerr that certain attempts to obtain governmental
intervention would continue to be subject to antitrust scrutiny if they
were a "mere sham" for attempts to "interfere directly with the busi-
ness relationships of a competitor."24 In Noerr, the facts belied applica-
tion of the sham exception. In California Motor Transport, however,
the Court not only gave extended consideration to this exception, but
found that the facts alleged stated a claim under the Sherman Act. Ad-
ditionally, the Court recognized that attempts to influence the legisla-
ture or the executive branch differed in kind from attempts to influence
the judiciary or administrative agencies.
In Californid Motor Transport, the parties were competing groups
of trucking companies, subject to regulation by federal and state agen-
cies. The defendants were principally established carriers; the plaintiffs
were attempting to enter some of the defendants' markets. The plain-
tiffs alleged that the defendants instituted frequent, groundless actions
before administrative agencies and in the courts, in an attempt to frus-
trate the adjudicative process, harass the plaintiffs, and deny them "free
and unlimited access" to those tribunals.2"
The first significant aspect of the Court's decision was a slight re-
treat from its earlier statement in Pennington that "Noerr shields from
the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regard-
less of intent or purpose. ' 6 In California Motor Transport, the Court
held:
The nature of the views pressed ... may bear upon a purpose to deprive
the competitors of meaningful access to the agencies and courts ....
[S]uch a purpose or intent, if shown,'would be "to discourage and ulti-
23 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
24 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144; see supra note 20.
2 The plaintiffs alleged that "the power, strategy, and resources of the [defendants]
were used to harass and deter [plaintiffs] in their use of administrative and judicial
proceedings so as to deny them 'free and unlimited access' to those tribunals." Califor-
nia Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 511.
26 Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670 (emphasis added).
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mately to prevent the respondents from invoking" the processes of the ad-
ministrative agencies and courts and thus fall within the exception to
Noerr."
Therefore, an appeal to these adjudicatory tribunals which was not
only anticompetitive, but also mounted in bad faith, would be within
the reach of the antitrust laws.
The California Motor Transport decision also makes the nature of
the governmental body being solicited relevant to the scope of the Noerr
exception. Noerr itself involved appeals for legislative enactments and
executive enforcement of existing law and vetoes of proposed legisla-
tion. California Motor Transport involved appeals to administrative
agencies and the courts. The Court began by noting that the same phi-
losophy governs citizen approaches to all these bodies, and "[clertainly
the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government."28
Having said this, however, the Court then stated that certain methods
of influencing decisionmaking, which were sanctioned in the political
arena of legislative and executive activity, would not be immunized
from antitrust scrutiny when undertaken in the adjudicatory setting of
administrative or judicial proceedings. 9
The Court suggested another potential limitation on the Noerr doc-
trine in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp? The
plaintiff and defendant were competitors in the production and sale of
vanadium, a metal which is mined and processed principally in the
United States. A subsidiary of the defendant was appointed as the ex-
clusive agent of the Canadian government for the purchase and alloca-
tion of vanadium in Canada. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
and its subsidiary, acting on behalf of the Canadian government, had
violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to deny the plaintiff the right to
export and sell vanadium in Canada. The Court rejected the suggestion
that this conduct was immunized by Noerr as part of an attempt to
influence a governmental decision. Rather, the Court characterized this
conduct as a "private commercial activity, no element of which involved
seeking to procure the passage or enforcement of laws." 3'
27 California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 512 (quoting concurrence of Justice Stew-
art, id. at 518).
28 Id. at 510.
2, "Misrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when
used in the adjudicatory process.. .. Insofar as the administrative or judicial processes
are involved, [certain] actions . . . cannot acquire immunity by seeking refuge under
the umbrella of 'political expression.'" Id. at 513.
3- 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
31 Id. at 707.
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This political-commercial distinction is a difficult one to apply, how-
ever. As the Court recognized in Noerr, persons often undertake politi-
cal activity for purely commercial purposes." The extent of this excep-
tion from the Noerr doctrine for "commercial activity," even when
directed at influencing governmental decisionmaking, has become an-
other area of controversy.3
Finally, in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 4 the Court dealt with one
of the issues raised by the interface of the Parker v. Brown35 state ac-
tion immunity doctrine and the Noerr-Pennington rule. In Cantor, the
defendant electric utility had submitted proposed tariffs to the state reg-
ulatory commission, which were eventually approved and which re-
quired the utility to replace burned-out light bulbs with new bulbs. In
response to a challenge that the light bulb program violated the Sher-
man Act, the utility argued that it was acting pursuant to state com-
mand and hence the state action doctrine36 shielded its conduct. In the
course of rejecting this argument, a plurality of the Court,37 in an opin-
ion by Justice Stevens, examined the relevance of Noerr. Presumably
Noerr would make lawful the defendant's act of petitioning the state
administrative agency to create and impose the tariff. The defendant
argued that a fbrtiori it could not be unlawful if, after this petitioning
proved successful, the utility adhered to the tariff's requirements as it
was required to do. Yet Justice Stevens concluded that the Noerr and
Parker issues were distinct. Although each step leading to the utility's
32 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 122-58 and accompanying text.
', 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
317 U.S. 341 (1941).
36 See generally Dorman, State Action Immunity: A Problem Under Cantor v. De-
troit Edison, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 503 (1977); Holzer, An Analysis for Recon-
ciling the Antitrust Laws with the Right to Petition: Noerr-Pennington in Light of
Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 27 EMORY L.J. 673 (1978); Kennedy, Of Lawyers,
Lightbulbs and Raisins: An Analysis-of the State Action Doctrine Under the Antitrust
Law, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 31 (1979); Shores, The State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb
and Cantor, 63 IowA L. REV. 367 (1977); 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 370
(1977); 77 COLUM. L. REV. 898 (1977); 62 CORNELL L. REV. 628 (1977); 1977 DUKE
L.J. 871.
3" Four members of the Court joined in the entire opinion. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at
581 n.t. Chief Justice Burger concurred in part, but expressly declined to concur in
that portion of the decision which included the Noerr discussion. See id. at 603. Justice
Blackmun concurred only in the judgment and wrote a separate opinion. See id. at 605.
Neither the Burger nor Blackmun opinions discussed the Noerr issue. See id. at 603-05
(Burger, C.J.), 605-14 (Blackmun, J.). Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion for
three members of the Court, which disagreed with Justice Stevens' Noerr analysis; see
id. at 601-02; infra note 40.
1984]
University of California, Davis
adherence to the suggested program might be lawful, this did not mean
that the entire anticompetitive program, once adopted, was also law-
ful. 8 Since the basic Parker rule is that "a state does not give immunity
to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate
it,"39 Noerr cannot confer immunity for the otherwise anticompetitive
and unlawful conduct"0 merely because the defendant has actively peti-
tioned for the particular state action. 1
"[The dissent's] analysis rests largely on the dubious assumption that if each of
several steps in the implementation of an anticompetitive program is lawful, the entire
program must be equally lawful." Cantor, 428 U.S. at 602 n.45.
" Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
40 [N]othing in the Noerr opinion implies that the mere fact that a state reg-
ulatory agency may approve a proposal included in a tariff, and thereby
require that the proposal be implemented until a revised tariff is filed and
approved, is a sufficient reason for conferring antitrust immunity on the
proposed conduct.
Cantor, 428 U.S. at 601-02.
The dissent accepted the defendant's argument about the implications of Noerr for
the Parker doctrine:
Surely, if a rule permitting Sherman Act liability to arise from lobbying
by private parties for state rules restricting competition would impair the
power of state governments to impose restraints, then afortiori a rule per-
mitting Sherman Act liability to arise from private parties' compliance
with such rules would impair the exercise of the States' power.
Id. at 623 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
" Discussion of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine can be found in a number of other
Supreme Court decisions. The only significant substantive addition to the basic rules
described above is in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977). A had
sued B in state court, alleging breach of a contract containing covenants not to compete.
After A obtained a judgment, B sued A in federal court, alleging that the underlying
contract violated the antitrust laws. B also sought a federal order enjoining A from
collecting upon the state court judgment. At issue was whether the Anti-Injunction Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), precluded a federal court from issuing an injunction of a state
court proceeding under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982), which gener-
ally authorizes injunctive relief to private parties in an antitrust action. In a split deci-
sion, the Court held that the federal district court was barred from issuing the
injunction.
An opinion by Justice Rehnquist for three members of the Court concluded that the
Anti-Injunction Act always bars such injunctions. Then, discussing the Noerr doctrine,
Justice Rehnquist noted that repetitious lawsuits might well be sham and thus unlaw-
ful under the antitrust laws. However, once a lawsuit commences in a state court, the
Anti-Injunction Act prohibits enjoining that lawsuit, even if it is frivolous or repetitive.
Vendo, 433 U.S. at 640-41. On the other hand, Justice Rehnquist asserted that, not-
withstanding the Act, future additional repetitious actions could be enjoined. Id. at 635
n.6.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger, wrote the other opinion making
up the majority. Id. at 643. He disagreed with Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that the
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The various Supreme Court decisions described above suggest some
of the limitations on the basic Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Among them
are potential differences in the exemption based on the nature of the
governmental body solicited"2 and whether the exemption is lost because
of the means used to obtain government relief or the motive underlying
the attempt. In addition, special problems have been raised by these
cases.
4 3
II. WHAT GOVERNMENTAL BODIES MAY BE SOLICITED?
In 1961, the Noerr Court held that the antitrust laws do not apply to
concerted attempts to obtain relief from the legislative or executive
branches of the government, even when such conduct has anticompeti-
tive effects. Until 1972, it was not clear whether this immunity also
applied to attempts to obtain action from the adjudicatory branches of
the government, the courts, and administrative agencies. 44 In California
Anti-Injunction Act could never be used in aid of an action brought under Clayton Act
§ 16 to enjoin a state court proceeding. However, Justice Blackmun would have carved
out a narrow exception to the Anti-Injunction Act only when the state proceedings
sought to be enjoined would give rise to an antitrust violation under the test stated in
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), which he
found inapplicable to the facts at bar. Justice Blackmun would require that the state
court proceedings must "themselves [be] part of a 'pattern of baseless, repetitive claims'
that are being used as an anticompetitive device." 433 U.S. at 643-44 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in result) (quoting California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513). This opin-
ion raises doubts whether Justice Blackmun believed that a single action, no matter
how frivolous, could ever be the basis of a sham proceeding claim.
Finally, Justice Stevens' dissent, joined by three other members of the Court, con-
cluded that the Anti-Injunction Act does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to
enjoin state court proceedings which violate the goals of the antitrust laws. Id. at 647
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In the course of that opinion, Justice Stevens asserted that
even a single frivolous or groundless lawsuit might be used to violate the antitrust laws.
Rejecting Justice Blackmun's approach, he concluded that the reference in California
Motor Transp. to "a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims" was illustrative but not
exhaustive. If the single proceeding was clearly unjustified, illegal, or fraudulent, Ste-
vens asserted that it could form the basis of a federal antitrust claim. Id. at 661-62.
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 399 & n.17
(1978), the Court reiterated and explained the holdings and policies of Noerr and Pen-
nington. The Court reiterated the sham exception in New Vehicle Motor Bd. v. Orrin
W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 110 & n.15 (1978), and in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366, 379-80 (1973).
2 See infra notes 44-65 and accompanying text.
, See infra notes 122-58 and accompanying text.
. See Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 432 F.2d 755, 759-60
(9th Cir. 1970) (citing other authorities), affd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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Motor Transport,45 however, the Court held that the same policy rea-
sons which dictated the inapplicability of the Sherman Act in Noerr
required antitrust immunity for citizen petitions to these adjudicatory
bodies." Yet, the Court also suggested that in the face of an antitrust
challenge, the same kinds of conduct might not be treated equally, de-
pending on the particular governmental entity being approached."
The Supreme Court's suggestion that different forms of petitioning
activity might be treated differently based on the type of governmental
body being approached 8 is borne out by cases applying the sham ex-
ception.49 Evidence of intent to exclude competitors may indeed be ir-
relevant in approaches to the legislative or executive branches of gov-
ernment;" thus the exception will be almost impossible to make out in
the context of these forms of political petitioning. However, intent has
frequently been examined in the context of assertedly sham litigation or
sham requests for administrative relief. 1
Protection of the right to petition should logically extend to all poli-
cymaking levels of government that influence the political and economic
lives of citizens. As might be expected, the Noerr rule has been held
applicable to approaches to local as well as state or federal governmen-
tal agencies."
" 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
46 Id. at 509-11; see supra note 28 and accompanying text. California Motor
Transp. involved immunity for applications to the state Public Utilities Commission
and the Interstate Commerce Commission, state and federal administrative agencies
regulating motor trucking. 432 F.2d at 757. Since then, Noerr-Pennington has been
applied to a variety of administrative agencies. See, e.g., Transkentucky Transp. R.R.
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 1983-2 Trade Cas. 1 65,476 (E.D. Ky. 1983) (ICC and state
railroad commission); Llewellyn v. Crothers, 1983-1 Trade Cas. 1 65,358 (D. Or.
1983) (state workers' compensation department); Miller & Son Paving v. Wrightstown
Township Civic Ass'n, 443 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (state department of envi-
ronmental resources), affd, 595 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843
(1979); see also Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 840 (9th Cir. 1980)
(Noerr-Pennington clearly applies to judicial proceedings).
4, See Metro Cable Co. v. CATV, 516 F.2d 220, 228 (7th Cir. 1975) (unethical
conduct tolerated in approach to city council, a legislative body, since activity took place
in a "political setting").
41 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
" See generally infra notes 85-121 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 16, 19, 22 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
52 See, e.g., Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226, 237 (5th Cir.
1983), adopting lower court decision in 519 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (city coun-
cil and mayor); Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, Mo., 693 F.2d
733, 746 (8th Cir. 1982) (city council, city manager, and city attorney), cert. denied,
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Problems have arisen because of difficulties in evaluating approaches
to three kinds of groups. The first area of concern is the application of
petitioning immunity to enforcement agencies. This petitioning would
hardly be thought of as typically political, a quality Noerr deemed at
the core of those activities which the antitrust laws did not reach. 3
Lower courts have held, however, that Noerr applies to citizen requests
for police department intervention 4 and to petitions to a state attorney
general.5 These decisions are consistent with the actual holding of No-
err, which involved, among other things, requests to the Governor of
Pennsylvania to enforce laws applicable to the weight and length of
trucks on state highways. Furthermore, it is probably as important to
preserve citizen access to these enforcement agencies, in order not to
chill the provision of information about possible violations of the law,
as it is to preserve petitioning regarding changes in the underlying law
itself."'
103 S. Ct. 2122 (1983); Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint
Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1976) (municipal
board of permit appeals), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); Metro Cable Co. v.
CATV, 516 F.2d 220, 229 (7th Cir. 1975) (mayor and city council); Sun Valley Dis-
posal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341, 342-43 (9th Cir. 1969) (county
commission); Hopkinsville Cable TV, Inc. v. Pennyroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F.
Supp. 543, 546-47 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (mayor, city council, city attorney); Bustop Shel-
ters, Inc. v. Convenience & Safety Corp., 521 F. Supp. 989, 994-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(municipal legislative/executive body).
" See supra note 8.
" Forro Precision, Inc. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 673 F.2d 1045,
1059-61 (9th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Hylton, 558 F. Supp. 872, 874-75
(S.D. Tex. 1982) (filing of criminal complaint with local law enforcement officials pro-
tected by first amendment), affd, 710 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1983) .
" Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1964); see also Fed-
eral Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharm. Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253, 262 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (exemption applies to lobbying of state boards of pharmacy), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 928 (1982); Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530,
542-43 (5th Cir. 1978) (exemption applies to communications to state board of medical
examiners), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
56 A related problem is whether Noerr-Pennington applies when the government ac-
tion sought is the implementation of a policy rather than its formulation; while input
into the making of a decision is clearly political, it is arguable that merely carrying it
out in nondiscretionary ways is not, and hence is unprotected. Compare Woods Explor.
& Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1297-98 (5th Cir. 1971) (no
immunity), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Pad-
dock Pool Builders, 424 F.2d 25, 31-33 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850
(1970) with Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361, 1366 (10th Cir. 1972)
(immunity applies to requests to state administrative agency to enforce laws) and infra
notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
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The Noerr-Pennington doctrine also applies to attempts to secure
legislation through the initiative process, including soliciting public
support therefor, as well as lobbying directed to a legislative body. 7 In
addition, immunity has been extended to petitions to private, quasi-
governmental groups which adopt standards or codes which are then
enacted by municipal and state governments. 8
A second area of uncertainty is the applicability of the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine to approaches to a branch of the government operating
a commercial enterprise, or acting in a private, proprietary capacity.
Some courts have held that petitioning immunity continues even when
the government is engaged in a money-making operation, for example,
as the lessor of space at an airport.59 Separating the government's regu-
latory role from its commercial undertaking may be impractical and
improper. On the other hand, if the government is merely acting as a
consumer, and persons violate the antitrust laws in the course of per-
suading the government to make purchases from it, then Noerr-Pen-
nington should no more be a shield than if similar acts were under-
taken in making sales to a private person.60 Similarly, the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine does not apply when the challenged conduct does
not involve petitioning at all, but rather a contractual agreement be-
tween two parties, one of whom happens to be a municipality.61
The third area of uncertainty in the application of Noerr-Pennington
concerns petitions to branches of foreign governments. On the one
hand, many of the policies underlying the basic doctrine, including the
desirability of public input on decisionmaking and the value to the gov-
s Subscription Television, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Theatre Owners Ass'n, 576 F.2d
230, 232 (9th Cir. 1978).
" Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 1983-2 Trade
Cas. 1 65,525, at 68,605-09 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (lobbying of National Fire Protection
Association and Underwriters Laboratories to adopt standards favorable to defendant is
protected); see also Federal Prescription Serv. v. American Pharm. Ass'n, 471 F. Supp.
126, 128 (D.D.C. 1979) (lobbying of governmental body composed of both public offi-
cials and private, interested citizens protected), affd in part, rev'd on other grounds,
663 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Rush-Hampton
Indus. v. Home Ventilating Inst., 419 F. Supp. 19, 25 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (same).
" In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 693 F.2d 84, 87-88 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3114 (1983); Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Fulton County,
Ga., 561 F. Supp. 667, 674-76 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
0 George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, 424 F.2d 25, 31-33 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); see also infra notes 138-43 and accompanying
text.
" Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 556 F. Supp. 664, 669
(S.D. Ohio 1983).
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ernment of the information received, apply with equal force to petitions
to foreign and domestic government branches. Yet if the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine is in part constitutionally based,"' there is no first
amendment imperative that individuals have unimpaired access to for-
eign governments and their branches. As a result, the decisions on this
question are divided: one finding Noerr-Pennington applicable to peti-
tions to foreign governments,63 another finding it inapplicable,64 and the
majority of decisions noting but not deciding the question. 5
III. WHAT MEANS MAY BE USED TO SEEK GOVERNMENTAL
INTERVENTION?
In Noerr, the trial court had predicated the applicability of the anti-
trust laws to the defendants' attempts to obtain legislative and executive
action on two key findings: the defendants' intent to injure the plain-
tiffs' competitive posture, and the use of deceptive and fraudulent tech-
niques." The Supreme Court found both of these irrelevant in deter-
mining potential antitrust liability. While the defendants' activities fell
"far short of the ethical standards generally approved in this coun-
62 See supra note 7.
63 Coastal States Mktg. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1364-67 (5th Cir. 1983); see also
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-08 (1962)
(discussed supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTI-
TRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 62 (Jan. 26, 1977) (Case N: ac-
cepting position that immunity also applies to petitions to foreign governments).
64 Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107-08
(C.D. Cal. 1971), affd on other grounds, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); see also Australia/Eastern U.S.A. Shipping Conf. v.
United States, 537 F. Supp. 807, 812-13 (D.D.C. 1982) (first amendment does not
apply to petitions to foreign governments; Noerr protection therefore weaker when gov-
ernment seeks disclosure, pursuant to Civil Investigative Demands, of such communica-
tions); infra note 156.
65 Associated Container Transp. (Australia) v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 60 n.10
(2d Cir. 1983); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 882 n.6 (5th
Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1244-45, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 393 (1983); Bulkferts
Inc. v. Salatin Inc., 574 F. Supp. 6, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Dominicus Americana Bohio v.
Gulf & W. Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 690 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Davis, Solici-
tation of Anticompetitive Action From Foreign Governments: Should the Noerr-Pen-
nington Doctrine Apply to Communications with Foreign Sovereigns?, 11 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 395 (1981); Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in
United States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 132 (1967); Comment, Corporate
Lobbyists Abroad: The Extraterritorial Application of Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Im-
munity, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1254 (1973).
66 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 133 (discussed supra notes 4-20 and accompanying text).
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try,"67 they were essentially of a political nature, and hence not subject
to antitrust scrutiny. The Court indicated that, with the exception of
activities which were a "mere sham to cover what is actually nothing
more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relation-
ship of a competitor,"" neither the motives nor the particular tech-
niques of a defendant seeking governmental relief could form the basis
of an antitrust action.
In California Motor Transport," however, the Court not only found
the sham exception sufficiently alleged to withstand a motion to dismiss
the complaint, but also indicated other methods of seeking governmen-
tal action which were sufficiently beyond the realm of accepted political
activity to form the basis of an antitrust claim.
The key distinction between the sham exception and these other lim-
itations is the difference between improper ends and improper means.
If the defendant's goal in seeking governmental action is not the action
at all, but rather to injure its competitor or to obtain a competitive
advantage, then the defendant's petitioning may properly be character-
ized as a sham. On the other hand, even if the defendant truly wants
the governmental action sought, certain means of attempting to obtain
that relief are so improper that they are beyond the realm of political
activity for antitrust purposes.
In California Motor Transport, the Court identified four forms of
unethical conduct which might result in antitrust violations: perjury of
witnesses, "use of a patent obtained by fraud to exclude a competitor
from the market,"70 "[clonspiracy with a licensing authority to elimi-
67 Id. at 140.
69 Id. at 144.
69 404 U.S. at 508 (1972) (discussed supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text).
70 Id. at 512. The Court cited Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174-77 (1965), for this proposition. The Walker Court had held
that a person sued for patent infringement could assert a counterclaim that the patentee
engaged in monopolization, in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1982), through the attempted enforcement of a patent which was obtained by inten-
tional fraud on the Patent Office. The Court made no mention of the possibility that
the predicate enforcement action might be immunized as a petition for governmental
relief under Noerr. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 512; see also United States
v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 189 (1963); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati
Milacron Inc., 562 F.2d 365, 372-73 (6th Cir. 1977) (enforcement of fraudulently ob-
tained patent is basis of attempt to monopolize claim; no mention of Noerr issue); cf.
Woods Explor. & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1298 (5th Cir.
1971) (knowingly filing false information with state regulatory commission), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972). The improper use of patent enforcement proceedings as
grounds for the sham exception is discussed infra note 114.
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nate a competitor,"" and "bribery of a public purchasing agent."" The
Court noted there are many other forms of illegal and reprehensible
practices "which may corrupt the administrative or judicial processes
and which may result in antitrust violations.""
As is true with respect to the sham exception, a higher ethical stan-
dard should be imposed on petitioners for adjudicatory branch relief
than for approaches to the political branches."" Thus, Noerr protected
the challenged approaches to the state legislature and to the governor's
office even though the railroads engaged in certain "unethical tactics,""5
but it is doubtful whether Noerr-Pennington would immunize bribery
of a legislator or perjury before a congressional hearing from antitrust
scrutiny.
Some courts have held that unlawful conduct between the defendants
and the governmental agents from whom they seek official action re-
sults in loss of Noerr-Pennington protection. 6 Additionally, intention-
" California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513. The Court cited Continental Ore Co.
v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962) (discussed supra notes
30-33 and accompanying text), and Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564 (9th
Cir. 1964).
72 California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513. The Court cited Rangen, Inc. v. Ster-
ling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965). There, the Ninth Circuit held that
the bribery of a public official stated an action under § 2 of the Clayton Act as
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982). See III E. KINTNER &
J. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 26.10 (1983). On the other hand, at least one
district court has held that although bribery and illegal campaign contributions may be
abuses of the administrative process, they cannot be the basis of antitrust liability if
they do not suggest an ulterior purpose of harming competition. Cow Palace, Ltd. v.
Associated Milk Producers, 390 F. Supp. 696, 704-05 (D. Colo. 1975). The court held
that since foreclosure of the plaintiff was not the object of these activities, the conduct
did not fall within the sham exception. Id. at 704 n.6. Yet, the court was probably
taking too narrow a view of California Motor Transp.; that case suggested several
illegal or unethical acts in addition to the sham exception which would take the case
out of the Noerr doctrine.
"' California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513.
" See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
" Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, Mo., 693 F.2d 733, 746 (8th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2122 (1983); Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 150, 440 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971). But cf First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land
Title Ass'n, 714 F.2d 1439, 1446-47 (8th Cir. 1983) (misrepresentations and false
statements in the context of legislative lobbying protected by Noerr doctrine), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 709 (1984); Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, 390 F.
Supp. 696, 700-05 (D. Colo. 1975) (even bribery of public officials and illegal cam-
paign contributions will not result in loss of petitioning immunity); Schenley Indus. v.
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ally furnishing false information to an administrative agency for use in
its decisionmaking process constitutes fraud and may be the basis of an
antitrust claim." The use of threats, intimidation, or other coercive
measures is also not within the scope of petitioning immunity.7" Other
courts, however, have held that even obviously improper forms of at-
tempted persuasion, while reprehensible and deserving of condemnation
under other statutes, did not justify denying Noerr-Pennington
immunity.79
Furthermore, the exemption does not extend to conduct preliminary
to the immunized joint approach to the government. Thus, if the defen-
dants engaged in discussion among themselves to set common prices for
their goods or services, and then agreed to solicit governmental approval
for this pricing program, Noerr-Pennington does not exempt the other-
wise unlawful price-fixing.8" Similarly, a defendant's refusal to deal
with the plaintiff is not immunized from antitrust scrutiny simply be-
cause the conduct then provoked the plaintiff's appeal to an administra-
tive agency protesting the refusal, even though the defendant's refusal
New Jersey Wine & Spirit Wholesalers Ass'n, 272 F. Supp. 872, 883-86 (D.N.J.
1967) (even acts unlawful under state law protected during course of legislative
lobbying).
" Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240,
1259-63 (9th Cir. 1982) (bringing this type of fraud within reach of antitrust laws a
natural expansion of Court's holding in Walker Process Equip v. Food Mach. &
Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965); see supra note 70 and accompanying text), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983); Israel v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 274-80
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (misrepresentation and suppression of information during administra-
tive agency proceedings); Woods Explor. & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438
F.2d 1286, 1298 (5th Cir. 1971) (filing false information reports with state administra-
tive agency), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel,
474 F. Supp. 168, 176-79 (D. Del. 1979) (filing false information with U.S. Treasury
Department and U.S. Customs Service, in connection with assessment of dumping du-
ties); see also General Aircraft Corp. v. Air Am., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C.
1979) (filing of misleading and falsely disparaging information with government pro-
curement agency).
"' Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chauffeurs, Local No. 150, 440 F.2d 1096,
1099 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971).
" See, e.g., Bustop Shelters, Inc. v. Convenience & Safety Corp., 521 F. Supp. 989,
995-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The Bustop court also held that such conduct did not bring
the defendants within the sham exception. For other decisions taking this latter ap-
proach, see infra notes 82, 108 and accompanying text.
'0 Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240,
1263-65 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983); United States v. South-
ern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 672 F.2d 469, 477 (5th Cir. 1982); see also
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 594 (1976) (discussed supra notes 34-41
and accompanying text).
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was a necessary prerequisite for obtaining agency review.81 All that is
sanctioned by petitioning immunity is the actual request for govern-
mental relief; if the preliminaries are themselves unlawful, governmen-
tal involvement in subsequent steps in the scheme will not protect them.
On the other hand, certain undesirable or unethical conduct does not
result in a loss of petitioning immunity. In addition to the third-party
techniques upheld in Noerr itself,82 the Noerr-Pennington doctrine ap-
plies when the conduct results in group boycotts of third parties. This
occurs in two situations: first, when the defendants request persons not
to do business with someone else as a means of putting pressure on
governmental officials in an attempt to obtain the enactment or enforce-
ment of certain legislation,8 3 and second, when the defendants' boycott
is simply an attempt to influence public opinion and general govern-
mental policy rather than an attempt to obtain particular governmental
action.84
IV. SHAM PETITIONS85
In Noerr, the Supreme Court stated in dictum that conduct which
was a mere sham of true attempts to engage in political activities, and
SI Mid-Texas Communications Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372,
1383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); see also Virginia Academy of
Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 482 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1980) (Noerr
inapplicable to concerted decision to refuse to follow state statute, which eventually
provoked enforcement action by state agency), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
"2 See supra note 14; see also Metro Cable Co. v. CATV, 516 F.2d 220, 231 (7th
Cir. 1975) (misrepresentation to city council entitled to petitioning immunity).
"' Coastal States Mktg. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1364 (5th Cir. 1983); Gambrel v.
Kentucky Bd. of Dentistry, 689 F.2d 612, 620-21 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 2108 (1983); Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1200-03 (8th
Cir. 1982); Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharm. Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253,
262-65 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Missouri v. National Org.
for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1312 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980);
Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 542-43 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979). But see Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware
Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553, 556-58 (D. Del. 1980) (boycott by
competitors, designed to persuade federal government to change regulatory policy, not
speech deserving Noerr protection).
"4 Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 492 F. Supp. 334, 338-39
(D. Mass. 1980) (refusal by labor union to unload ships engaged in trade with Soviet
Union protected political activity), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1120 (1982).
" A number of articles have specifically addressed the sham exception. See, e.g.,
Balmer, Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Laws, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 39 (1980);
Kaler, The Sham Exception to the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity: Its Potential
for Minimizing Anticompetitive Abuse of the Administrative Regulatory Process, 12 U.
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which was designed simply to exclude competitors or injure competi-
tion, would not be protected from antitrust scrutiny. 6 Subsequently, in
California Motor Transport," the Court held that allegations of the
use of the political process solely to deny competitors "free and unlim-
ited access" to administrative agencies and the courts were sufficient to
take the conduct outside the scope of Noerr-Pennington immunity."
However, the plaintiffs' allegations were so general that the contours of
the sham exception were left vague. Lower court decisions of the past
decade have attempted to delineate its limitations. As might be ex-
pected, these decisions, which involve significant questions of fact, 9
have been neither uniform nor consistent in scope and analysis.90 How-
ever, the trend appears to be toward an expansion of the sham excep-
tion and some limitation on the scope of Noerr-Pennington immunity.
Sham petitions for governmental action will result in loss of immu-
nity, regardless of the body or agency being petitioned. However, the
Court in California Motor Transport indicated that certain methods of
influencing decisionmaking which would be sanctioned in the political
arena would not be immunized from antitrust scrutiny when under-
taken in an adjudicatory setting.' Petitioning immunity has since been
TOL. L. REV. 63 (1980); 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 573 (1983); 48 Miss. L.J. 634
(1977); 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 407 (1977); see also Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts
to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doc-
trine, 45 U. CMI. L. REV. 80, 104-10 (1977) (suggesting that sham exception be coex-
tensive with first amendment protection of petitioning).
" See supra notes 20, 68 and accompanying text.
" 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
1S See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
, Whether something is a genuine effort to influence governmental action, or a
mere sham, is a question of fact." Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff
Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234
(1983); see also United States v. Central State Bank, 564 F. Supp. 1478, 1482 (W.D.
Mich. 1982).
90 There is some uncertainty whether the plaintiff has a higher burden of pleading
the elements of a claim coming within the sham exception. Although Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) contemplates merely "notice pleading," a "short and plain
statement of the [plaintiff's] claim," the potential chilling effect of ongoing litigation
might counsel placing higher burdens on the plaintiff before permitting an antitrust
action to continue. Cf Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 507 F. Supp. 939, 943-44
(E.D. Mich. 1981) (no higher burden on plaintiff; citing other cases); Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168, 172-73 (D. Del. 1979) (dismissing defen-
dant's counterclaim as vague, but refusing to adopt higher standard of pleading).
" See supra note 29 and accompanying text; accord Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Cod-
ding, 615 F.2d 830, 842 (9th Cir. 1980); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. 1 65,525, at 68,609 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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held applicable to lobbying for legislative or executive relief, regardless
of the methods used or the defendants' intent.92 Thus, application of the
sham doctrine to other than spurious litigation or resort to administra-
tive agency relief will be quite infrequent, if it is available at all." On
the other hand, petitions to these latter enforcement branches may well
fall within the sham exception, and be subject to antitrust scrutiny, if
there are allegations of abusive or unethical conduct or an absence of
genuine intent to obtain governmental relief."'
The sham exception can apply either when the defendant has no real
desire to prevail in the proceedings, but is using them to injure compet-
itors, or when the defendant has engaged in certain prohibited conduct.
Two kinds of analysis are useful in determining the applicability of the
exception. One involves subjective criteria of motivation or intent, and
the other, various objective factors. Although the Noerr Court held the
defendants' intent irrelevant in determining the existence of petitioning
immunity,95 this assertion was substantially qualified in California Mo-
tor Transport."' Since then, courts have held that the defendants' intent
is the principal criterion in determining whether attempts to obtain
governmental relief are a sham.97 As a corollary, petitioning immunity
92 See Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd.
of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1976) ("attempts to lobby and
petition a governmental body . . . are absolutely immune from antitrust liability")
(footnote omitted), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); id. at 1081 n.4 (sham exception
applies only to "activities external to or abusive of the legislative, administrative or
judicial process").
Although some sources reject any application of the sham exception to petitions to
the legislature or executive branches, it must be remembered that Noerr itself, which
involved requests for relief from these two political branches, first articulated the sham
exception.
" See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text; see also Reaemco, Inc. v. Allegheny
Airlines, 496 F. Supp. 546, 557 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Noerr governs sham exception in
legislative setting; California Motor Transp. governs judicial or administrative
petitioning).
" The actual costs of litigation and agency proceedings can be high, and the delays
inherent in judicial or administrative resolution substantial. Thus, were there no sham
exception, it might be a wise competitive strategy for a company to engage its competi-
tors in expensive and protracted litigation, not because of any hope of success or intent
to enforce the law, but merely to disadvantage and even destroy the competitor. The
policies underlying Noerr-Pennington clearly do not require extending petitioning im-
munity to cover such conduct.
" See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678, 687 (4th
Cir. 1982) ("misrepresentations, to fall within the sham exception. . ., must be made
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will usually continue when the defendant's attempt to obtain govern-
mental action is taken in good faith,98 or when the defendant is actually
seeking some form of "official action" rather than merely attempting
"to interfere with the business relationship of a competitor." '99
Although one court has held that the plaintiff, in order to make out a
sham case, need not show that the defendant acted "maliciously,"'' 00 an-
other court has held that it is insufficient to show that the defendant's
action was brought "without probable cause." Rather, the plaintiff
must show that the claim was "abusive of the judicial process."'' 1 The
with the requisite intent"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 231, 259 (1983); Mark Aero, Inc. v.
Trans World Airlines, 580 F.2d 288, 297 (8th Cir. 1978) ("Itlhe fundamental question
presented in each case involving the 'sham' exception . . . is the question of intent");
Israel v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
In determining whether the petitioning is entitled to immunity, the court must focus
on the conduct of the defendants engaging in that petitioning, not on the conduct of the
government officials. Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharm. Ass'n, 663
F.2d 253, 266 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1981).
" See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 1983); Coastal
States Mktg. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1372 (5th Cir. 1983) ("A litigant should enjoy
petitioning immunity from the antitrust laws so long as a genuine desire for judicial
relief is a significant motivating factor underlying the suit."); Coca-Cola Co. v. Over-
land, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1257 (9th Cir. 1982); Forro Precision, Inc. v. International
Business Machs. Corp., 673 F.2d 1045, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 1982); Semke v. Enid Auto.
Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361, 1365-66 (10th Cir. 1972).
On the other hand, the plaintiff's allegations have sufficiently suggested an absence
of good faith and come within the sham exception in a number of cases. See, e.g.,
Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1982); Hospital
Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 231, 259 (1983); Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc.,
690 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983); Israel v. Baxter
Labs., Inc., 466 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Transkentucky Transp. R.R. v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 1983-2 Trade Cas. 1 65,476 (E.D. Ky. 1983); United States Audio & Copy
Corp. v. Phillips Business Sys., 1983-1 Trade Cas. 65,364 (N.D. Cal. 1983); United
States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 581-83
(N.D. Ill. 1975); see also Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586
F.2d 530, 542-43 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1978) (existence of sham exception is question of
fact; no special burden of proof on plaintiff), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979). But see
MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1155 (7th
Cir.) (in view of first amendment considerations, appropriate to place heavier burden of
proof of sham litigation on plaintiff), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983).
" Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of
Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940
(1977); see also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168, 174-75 (D. Del.
1979) (prior litigation not rendered sham because defendants there were impecunious).
,oo Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, 694 F.2d 466, 472-73 (7th Cir. 1982).
,' Hydro-Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 673 F.2d 1171, 1175-77 (10th Cir.
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Seventh Circuit has recently provided what may be the soundest test for
evaluating the defendant's intent in bringing the prior action, although
the court itself recognized that application of the test was not without
difficulty: "The line is crossed when [the defendant's] purpose is not to
win a favorable judgment against a competitor but to harass him, and
deter others, by the process itself - regardless of outcome - of
litigating.""1 2
More useful than these subjective criteria are certain identifiable fac-
tors which show that the defendant's attempt to obtain governmental
relief was a sham. The defendant's use of improper or illegal conduct is
certainly evidence of bad faith in the course of the litigation or agency
proceeding."0 ' Thus, the sham exception has been applied when the de-
fendant acted fraudulently by filing false information with, or know-
ingly making groundless objections before, a court or administrative
agency,"' when the defendant's attorney engaged in unethical conduct
1982); see also Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharm. Ass'n, 663 F.2d
253, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Anticompetitive intent alone is not enough. Nor is it suffi-
cient that the persons engaged in lobbying activity also engaged in 'a pattern of actions'
... .[Plaintiffs must show] that the lobbyists subverted the integrity of the govern-
mental process . . . ."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982).
"', Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982). In
another formulation of the test, the court stated that the litigation is sham when "the
plaintiff wants to hurt a competitor not by getting a judgment against him, which
would be a proper objective, but just by the maintenance of the suit, regardless of its
outcome." Id.; see also Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 229-30 (7th
Cir. 1983); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 810 (2d Cir. 1983)
(test is "whether a defendant 'truly sought to influence the governmental decision' and
whether there was a 'reasonable expectation' of doing so"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 984
(1984).
"' See Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 811 (2d Cir. 1983)
(intentional efforts by monopolist to "delay and obfuscate" administrative agency deci-
sionmaking), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 984 (1984); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park
Dist., 557 F.2d 580, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1977) (submission of outrageously high bid to
governmental body acting as lessor, resulting in loss of concessions by plaintiff, might
be sham), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); see also Associated Radio Serv. Co. v.
Page Airways, 624 F.2d 1342, 1358 (5th Cir. .1980) ("specific acts, other than those
incidental to the normal use of the courts," justify sham exemption conclusion), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., 473
F. Supp. 680, 690 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (various "corrupt and coercive practices").
04 See, e.g., Forro Precision, Inc. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 673 F.2d
1045, 1060 (9th Cir. 1982) (dictum); Transkentucky Transp. R.R. v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 1983-2 Trade Cas. 1 65,476, at 68,307-09 (E.D. Ky. 1983); United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1364 (D.D.C. 1981) (knowingly taking
baseless positions before agency); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text; cf.
Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culi-
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during the challenged judicial proceedings, t05 when the defendant
threatened litigation against or otherwise harassed the customers of its
competitor," 6 or when the defendant instituted proceedings before
agencies which it knew lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim.'
Similar conclusions may be drawn from the filing of false affidavits in a
court proceeding, or using litigation principally to generate and dissem-
inate adverse publicity about the plaintiff.0 8
A second objective criterion for the sham exception is the number of
proceedings initiated by the defendant. It is easy to infer an intent to
abuse the judicial or administrative process if the defendant has
brought a number of prior actions." 9 Although the cases are divided,
there is substantial authority for the proposition that even a single
claim may be grounds for application of the sham exception.110
nary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 1976) (sham exception inapplicable
when defendants did not engage in publicity campaign or threaten plaintiff), cert. de-
nied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977).
loS Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d 891, 896 (2d Cir. 1981).
100 Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1200-03 (8th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2108 (1983); Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources, Inc.,
460 F. Supp. 1359, 1386 (D. Hawaii 1978).
0' MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1156
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983); see also Borough of Lansdale v. Phila-
delphia Elec. Co., 517 F. Supp. 218, 222 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (filings by electric utility
with regulatory agency which had "no economic justification").
"I See, e.g., Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386, 389 (9th
Cir. 1983); United States Audio & Copy Corp. v. Phillips Business Sys., 1983-1 Trade
Cas. 1 65,364, at 70,174 (N.D. Cal. 1983). But see Metro Cable Co. v. CATV, 516
F.2d 220, 230-31 (7th Cir. 1975) (campaign contributions and misrepresentations);
Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagan Real Estate, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1124, 1132-36 (N.D.N.Y.
1977) ("illegal actions" before town board and "unlawfully contesting" litigation), affd
mene., 578 F.2d 1372 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978); Central Bank v.
Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163, 166-67 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (defendant's assertion of
"sham and spurious grounds" for denial of plaintiff's application to state administrative
agency insufficient to fall within sham exception), affd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, 390 F.
Supp. 696, 704 (D. Colo. 1975) (bribery and illegal campaign contributions in the
course of administrative agency proceedings not sufficient to make out sham exception).
"o' See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372, 379-80
(1973) (four lawsuits which had effect of delaying or impeding competition might sat-
isfy sham exception); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 840 (9th Cir.
1980) (13 repetitive and baseless lawsuits); cf Ad Visor, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., 640 F.2d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1981) (filing of 63 state court collection actions not
sham when claims were well-grounded); Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagan Real Estate, 454 F.
Supp. 1124, 1135 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (three unsuccessful actions not necessarily sham),
affd inein., 578 F.2d 1372 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978).
"0 The origin of the dispute is language in the California Motor Transp. decision:
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A third kind of evidence that a party is proceeding in bad faith is the
fact that the claims or attempts to obtain governmental action proved
"One claim, which a court or agency may think baseless, may go unnoticed; but a
pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude
that the administrative and judicial processes have been abused." Calfornia Motor
Transp., 404 U.S. at 513. The significance of this passage was then discussed by Jus-
tices Blackmun and Stevens in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977).
Justice Blackmun suggested the unlikelihood that a single claim could satisfy the sham
exception test, id. at 645, while Justice Stevens concluded for the dissent that the lan-
guage in California Motor Transp. was illustrative rather than limiting, id. at 661-62.
See supra note 41.
A number of courts have concluded that a single baseless claim may be sham, to
which petitioning immunity does not apply. See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718
F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 1983); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1154-55 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983); Energy
Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 1983); Clipper Exx-
press v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1254-57 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983); Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v.
Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543 n.6 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979);
United States Audio & Copy Corp. v. Phillips Business Sys., 1983-1 Trade Cas.
65,364, at 70,174 (N.D. Cal. 1983); National Cash Register Corp. v. Arnett, 554 F.
Supp. 1176, 1177-78 (D. Colo. 1983); First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title
Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 1147, 1158-59 (D.S.D. 1982), affd, 714 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 709 (1984); Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc. v. LeMay, 536
F. Supp. 247, 253 n.4 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 507 F.
Supp. 939, 944-46 (E.D. Mich. 1981); First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 482
F. Supp. 514, 519-21 (D. Minn. 1979), affd mer., 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981); Technicon Medical Information Sys. v. Green Bay
Packaging, 480 F. Supp. 124, 126-28 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Colorado Petroleum Market-
ers Ass'n v. Southland Corp., 476 F. Supp. 373, 378-79 (D. Colo. 1979); Cyborg Sys.
v. Management Science Am., Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. 61,927, at 73,918 (N.D. Ill.
1978); Associated Radio Serv. v. Page Airways, 414 F. Supp. 1088, 1096 (N.D. Tex.
1976), affd, 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980).
Other cases suggest that the plaintiff must show multiple baseless lawsuits. See, e.g.,
Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301, 1314 (E.D. Mich.
1979), vacated, 666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981); MCI Communications Corp. v. Ameri-
can Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F. Supp. 1072, 1103 (N.D. I11. 1978) (dictum), affd, 708
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983); Mountain Grove Cemetery
Ass'n v. Norwalk Vault Co., 428 F. Supp. 951, 955 (D. Conn. 1977); Central Bank v.
Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163, 167 (E.D. Mo. 1976), affd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Bethlehem Plaza v. Campbell, 403 F. Supp. 966,
970-71 (E.D. Pa. 1975); see also Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d
785, 811 n.38 (2d Cir. 1983) (division of opinion noted), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 984
(1984); Hydro-Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 673 F.2d 1171, 1176-77 (10th Cir.
1982) (applicability of sham exception to single lawsuit open question; no need to re-
solve); Invictus Records, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 98 F.R.D. 419, 430 (E.D.
Mich. 1982) (same).
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groundless or unsuccessful."' Similarly, proof that the antitrust defen-
dant was successful in the prior proceeding is strong evidence that it
was not a sham, since the acceptance of the defendant's position by the
legislature, court or other governmental body is persuasive that the ar-
guments were not baseless." 2 However, even a claim on which the de-
fendant prevailed may be the basis for loss of petitioning immunity
through application of the sham exception.' By the same token, the
mere fact that litigation or lobbying eventually proves unsuccessful does
not make it sham."' The critical element is a showing that the defen-
"' Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d 891, 896 (2d Cir. 1981) (multi-
ple groundless lawsuits, which defendants sought to delay); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v.
Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 841 & n.13 (9th Cir. 1980); Transkentucky Transp. R.R. v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 1983-2 Trade Cas. 1 65,476, at 68,309 (E.D. Ky. 1983).
"I Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharm. Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253, 265
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Mid-Texas Communications Sys.
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1383-84 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980); Taylor Drug Stores v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 560 F.2d 211, 213
(6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local
Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Home Inc., 568 F.
Supp. 494, 501 (W.D. Pa. 1983); First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title
Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 1147, 1157 (D.S.D. 1982), affd, 714 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 709 (1984); Central Bank v. Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163,
167 (E.D. Mo. 1976), affd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910
(1977); see Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc. v. LeMay, 536 F. Supp. 247, 251-53 (S.D.
Ohio 1982) (defendant's counterclaim asserted that plaintiff's action was baseless; court
stayed counterclaim until principal claim was litigated, since outcome would prove
whether plaintiff's claim was sham); see also Llewellyn v. Crothers, 1983-1 Trade Cas.
1 65,358, at 70,139-40 (D. Or. 1983).
"I See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 662 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The mere fact that the [state] courts concluded that petitioner's state-law
claim was meritorious does not disprove the existence of a serious federal antitrust
violation."); Sunergy Communities, Inc. v. Aristek Properties, 535 F. Supp. 1327, 1331
(D. Colo. 1982); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168, 179 (D. Del.
1979) (prior proceeding may have been successful because of defendant's improper con-
duct; success not dispositive).
But cf. Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1257 & n.17 (9th Cir.
1982) ("We need not decide whether the bringing of meritorious trademark-infringe-
ment suits can ever constitute sham suits violative of the antitrust laws.") (footnote
omitted); Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1964) (immunity
not lost even if executive action sought by defendant later proved without substantial
merit); Invictus Records, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 98 F.R.D. 419, 430
(E.D. Mich. 1982) ("a necessary element ...is termination of the lawsuit in [plain-
tiffs'] favor"); WIXT Television, Inc. v. Meredith Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1003, 1032
(N.D.N.Y. 1980) ("by definition a successful claim cannot be 'sham' ").
"' See, e.g., Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1200 (8th Cir.
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dant proceeded with the judicial or administrative action automatically,
without any concern for the merits of the action or the probability of
success.
115
A fourth factor is whether the plaintiff was barred from access to the
adjudicatory process as a result of the defendant's conduct.'"6 The better
rule is that even if the plaintiff were not denied access completely to the
courts or agencies," 7 the sham exception applies when the defendant
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2108 (1983); First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land
Title Co., 541 F. Supp. 1147, 1157-58 (D.S.D. 1982), affd, 714 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 709 (1984); Classic Film Museum, Inc. v. Warner
Bros., 523 F. Supp. 1230, 1234 (D. Me. 1981).
Particular problems arise when the plaintiff asserts that the defendant's previous
patent infringement actions were motivated by an anticompetitive or exclusionary ani-
mus. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d
986, 992-93 (9th Cir. 1979), the goals of patent and antitrust protection may at times
conflict. The patentee must be allowed to assert that others are infringing its patent,
even when the violation is not clear-cut; imposing potential antitrust liability on every
unsuccessful patentee would significantly diminish the value of the patent protection.
On the other hand, the sham exception to Noerr is based on the premise that persons
should not be permitted to use the courts to further anticompetitive activities when their
judicial claims have little or no merit. The Ninth Court reconciled these interests by
establishing a presumption that the patent infringement suit was in good faith, and
requiring the antitrust plaintiff to overcome this presumption by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. at 996; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text; cf Kobe, Inc. v.
Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.) (multiple baseless patent infringement
actions, coupled with threats to others in industry and publicity of lawsuits, evidence of
monopolization; pre-Noerr decision), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952); see also Rex
Chainbelt, Inc. v. Harco Prods., 512 F.2d 993, 1004-07 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 831 (1975); Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 830-33 (9th Cir. 1963);
Prelin Indus. v. G & G Crafts, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 52, 70-71 (W.D. Okla. 1972); cf.
Subscription Television Co. v. Southern Cal. Theatre Owners Ass'n, 576 F.2d 230,
233-34 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendants successfully obtained passage of legislation through
initiative process; statute later declared unconstitutional); First Nat'l Bank v. Mar-
quette Nat'l Bank, 482 F. Supp. 514, 519 (D. Minn. 1979) (lobbying for legislation
protected even if it results in adoption of statute later deemed unconstitutional), affd
mein., 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981).
", Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240,
1254 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
"I See, e.g., id. at 1257-59 (access barring is evidentiary of sham exception, but not
necessary in every case); Transkentucky Transp. R.R. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 1983-2
Trade Cas. 1 65,476, at 68,308-10 (E.D. Ky. 1983); WIXT Television, Inc. v. Mere-
dith Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1003, 1032-34 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagan
Real Estate, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1124, 1131, 1133-36 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), affd mere., 578
F.2d 1372 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978).
"' Access barring does not make much sense in the judicial context. The antitrust
plaintiff's claim is not that the defendant prevented it from having full access to the
court, but rather that the defendant forced it to undergo baseless or frivolous litigation.
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denies the plaintiff "meaningful or complete access.""' 8
If the defendant's litigation or petitioning is genuine, the immunity
extends not only to the actual proceeding'' but also to related activities.
Thus, good faith threats of litigation, or publicity of good faith litiga-
tion, are also beyond the reach of antitrust liability.'2 ° On the other
,.a Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 809 n.36 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 984 (1984); Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 507 F. Supp.
939, 946-48 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168,
176-77 & n.14 (D. Del. 1979); cf. Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco
Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1081-82 (9th Cir.
1976) (sham exception did not apply when defendant did not deny plaintiff access to
administrative agencies or courts), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977). The Ninth Cir-
cuit later limited its Franchise Realty holding in Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain
Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1258-59 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1234 (1983). In Clipper Exxpress, the Ninth Circuit cited California Motor Transp.
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511-13 (1972), for the proposition that "the
concepts of access barring and abuse of the judicial process were treated interchangea-
bly." 690 F.2d at 1257; see also Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 841
n.14 (9th Cir. 1980); Metro Cable Co. v. CATV, 516 F.2d 220, 232 (7th Cir. 1975)
(access barring theory does not apply when municipal legislature declines to hold hear-
ing prior to decisionmaking); Colorado Petroleum Marketers Ass'n v. Southland Corp.
476 F. Supp. 373, 380 (D. Colo. 1979).
'' Petitioning immunity has been held applicable, and the sham exception has been
rejected under the particular facts, in a number of cases. See, e.g., Coastal States Mktg.
v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1368-73 (5th Cir. 1983); Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of
Rochester, 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980); Mark Aero, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, 580
F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1978); Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, 561 F.2d 807, 812
(10th Cir. 1977); Taylor Drug Stores v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 560 F.2d 211
(6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 550
F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1977); Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361, 1366-67
(10th Cir. 1972); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp.,
1983-2 Trade Cas. 1 65,525, at 68,609-11 (N.D. Il1. 1983); Rohm & Haas Co. v.
Dawson Chem. Co., 557 F. Supp. 739, 840-42 (S.D. Tex. 1983); United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1362-64 (D.D.C. 1981); WIXT Tele-
vision, Inc. v. Meredith Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1003, 1030-35 (N.D.N.Y. 1980);
Reaemco, Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 496 F. Supp. 546, 555-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); First
Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 482 F. Supp. 514, 517-21 (D. Minn. 1979),
affd mein., 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981); Out-
board Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168, 172-76 (D. Del. 1979); Mountain
Grove Cemetery Ass'n v. Norwalk Vault Co., 428 F. Supp. 951 (D. Conn. 1977);
Bethlehem Plaza v. Campbell, 403 F. Supp. 966, 968-71 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Cow Palace,
Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, 390 F. Supp. 696, 703-04 (D. Colo. 1975); see also
Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643, 649-51 (7th Cir. 1983) (adopting
district court opinion).
,"' See, e.g., Coastal States Mktg. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1983);
Consortium, Inc. v. Dorner, 1983-2 Trade Cas. 1 65,568, at 68,826 (E.D. Tenn.
1983); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 557 F. Supp. 739, 842 (S.D. Tex.
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hand, if the litigation is sham, then related activities such as collusive
settlements with third parties may also become the basis for an anti-
trust claim.'21
V. SPECIAL PROBLEMS UNDER THE Noerr-Pennington DOCTRINE
A number of special problems have arisen under the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine. Among these are the following: (1) How broadly does
the immunity extend to other activities which are distinct from but re-
lated to the basic petitioning process? (2) To what extent is the immu-
nity qualified by the essentially commercial nature of the defendant's
activities and the government's role in controlling it? Does the immu-
nity exist even if the government is acting in a private or proprietary
capacity? (3) To what extent might the immunity be lost if government
officials are deemed co-conspirators in the defendant's anticompetitive
conduct? (4) Are there other limitations on the scope of Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity?
A. Breadth of Immunity
Noerr-Pennington immunity extends principally to the actual process
of soliciting relief from a governmental body. The doctrine does not
normally extend to steps which are preliminary to or ancillary to the
act of petitioning. It does not apply to independent conduct taken after
the solicitation of the government is concluded, even if the subsequent
conduct is the end result of prior petitioning.'22
The limited scope of petitioning immunity is illustrated by an analy-
sis of two decisions, Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff
Bureau, Inc.'23 and Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co."' In Clipper Exx-
press, the defendants, who operated in a regulated industry, first dis-
1983); First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 1147, 1158
(D.S.D. 1982), affd, 714 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 709
(1984); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168, 174 (D. Del. 1979);
Pennwalt Corp. v. Zenith Labs., 472 F. Supp. 413, 424 (E.D. Mich. 1979), appeal
dismissed mein., 615 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1980); Clairol, Inc. v. Boston Discount
Center, 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,108, at 70,020 (E.D. Mich. 1976), affd on other
grounds, 608 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1979). But see Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Re-
sources, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1359, 1386 (D. Hawaii 1978) (threats of litigation directed
to competitors' customers unprotected by Noerr-Pennington).
121 See, e.g., Victor Beauty Supply Co. v. Lus-Ter-Oil Beauty Prods. Co., 1983-1
Trade Cas. 65,417, at 70,478 (N.D. I11. 1983).
122 Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1964).
123 690 F.2d 1240, 1263-65 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
12- 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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cussed among themselves the rates they would charge their customers.
They then jointly petitioned the regulatory bodies for administrative
orders preventing their competitors from charging lower rates. The
Ninth Circuit held that even if the petitioning itself was immunized by
Noerr-Pennington, the defendants' preliminary steps of discussing and
agreeing upon higher prices was outside the scope of the doctrine.'25
Thus, a defendant's overall scheme may be unlawful, even though part
of it is immunized activity.' 26
This is a sound result. Otherwise, many activities or agreements in
restraint of trade would be followed by the conspirators petitioning for
government action or approval, thereby seeking to bring the prior un-
"2' "An antitrust violation does not enjoy immunity simply because an element of
that violation involves an action which itself is not illegal." Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d
at 1263; see also California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,
513-15 (1972).
The exchange of information among competitors may substantially diminish compe-
tition, particularly when the information concerns prices. Such exchanges have been
held to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
These information exchanges may have anticompetitive effects regardless of whether
they are preliminary to joint attempts to obtain governmental action.
,26 "[Wjhen there is a conspiracy prohibited by the antitrust laws, and the otherwise
legal litigation is nothing but an act in furtherance of that conspiracy, general antitrust
principles apply, notwithstanding the existence of Noerr immunity." Clipper Exxpress,
690 F.2d at 1263; see also Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Ass'n, 568 F.2d 670, 674 (10th
Cir. 1977) (other activities of defendants may violate antitrust laws although petition-
ing is exempt); Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 969
(W.D. Mo. 1982) (allegedly illegal merger, contemporaneous with but unrelated to
protected petitioning activity, unprotected by Noerr), affd, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir.
1983); Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp.
553 (D. Del. 1980) (boycott by competitors to persuade government to change policy
not protected by Noerr; cf. supra text accompanying notes 83-84). But cf. Hospital
Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678, 688 (4th Cir. 1982) ("We . . .
hesitate . . . to rule that any act accompanying a larger conspiracy in restraint of trade,
which also may be fairly characterized as 'abuse of process,' falls within the sham
exception."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 231, 259 (1983); Schenley Indus. v. New Jersey
Wine & Spirit Wholesalers Ass'n, 272 F. Supp. 872, 885-86 (D.N.J. 1967) (allegation
that defendants' illegal legislative lobbying was part of larger overall scheme does not
state antitrust claim).
One commentator has argued that when unethical conduct in the course of petition-
ing is an integral part of a larger anticompetitive scheme, the defendant's activities will
be brought within the sham exception. Bien, Litigation as an Antitrust Violation: Con-
flict Between the First Amendment and the Sherman Act, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 41, 83-86
(1981). It seems preferable to assert that while the petitioning itself may be protected,
the overall scheme is subject to the antitrust laws and is not immunized because pro-
tected activity is only one, albeit essential, component part.
580 [Vol. 17:549
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
lawful conduct under the umbrella of Noerr-Pennington immunity. 127
Similarly, in Cantor, the defendant had petitioned the state regula-
tory agency to adopt a tariff. After the tariff was adopted, the defendant
was of course required to adhere to its terms. The act of soliciting the
new tariff was protected by Noerr-Pennington.28 But after concluding
that the tariff was not state action and hence was unprotected by the
Parker v. Brown1 29 doctrine, the Supreme Court held 30 thatthe defen-
dant's subsequent conduct in conformance with the tariff was beyond
the scope of the petitioning immunity.'3 '
This principle can cause substantial problems for a defendant. If the
conduct ordered is deemed state action, the defendant's conformity will
be immunized by Parker v. Brown.'3 2 If, on the other hand, the conduct
121 In Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 806-09 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 984 (1984), plaintiff complained that AT & T, the
existing monopolist in the telecommunications industry, had sought to forestall competi-
tion by filing tariffs with the FCC which would have delayed and made more expensive
the plaintiff's market entry. The court held Noerr-Pennington inapplicable, because
AT & T's tariff filing was a "mere incident of regulation," and was not tantamount to
a request for governmental action. Id. at 807 (emphasis in original). The allegedly
unlawful conduct was really the preliminary decision by AT & T to impose the tariff
and then to seek FCC approval; thus, AT & T was "engaged in private commercial
activity, no element of which involved seeking to procure the passage or enforcement of
laws." Id.; accord MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081,
1159-60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983); United States v. Title Ins.
Rating Bureau, 517 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (D. Ariz. 1981); see also United States v.
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 672 F.2d 469, 476-77 (5th Cir. 1982);
Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 882 n.6 (5th Cir. 1982),
vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1244, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 393 (1983); Mid-Texas Communica-
tions Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1383 (5th Cir. 1980); Com-
merce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553 F.2d 793, 800 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977); Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564, 566
(9th Cir. 1964); United States Audio & Copy Corp. v. Phillips Business Sys., 1983-1
Trade Cas. 65,364, at 70,174 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Citicorp v. Interbank Card Ass'n,
478 F. Supp. 756, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). But cf. Horsemen's Benevolent & Protection
Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Comm'n, 530 F. Supp. 1098, 1110 (E.D. Pa.)
("Since the law permits [the defendants to petition for an increase in their fees], it
follows that they must be permitted to confer and to agree upon the fees they wish to
propose."), affd iner., 688 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1982).
.2 See Metro Cable Co. v. CATV, 516 F.2d 220, 229 (7th Cir. 1975).
12 317 U.S. 341 (1941).
,o See supra note 40.
3 In many situations, petitioning activities need not lead to any subsequent con-
forming acts by the petitioner. For example, in Noerr itself, the railroads sought legis-
lation and executive enforcement of existing laws. While both of the requests were
successful, they only required conforming conduct by the truckers.
,32 Cf Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991, 1023-29 (S.D.
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does not rise to that level - and the standards for determining state
action are admittedly confusing - then adherence to conduct required
of the defendant may subject it to liability under the antitrust laws.
Furthermore, the defendant's conformity is not protected by Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity for the prior petitioning for the state action. Argua-
bly the incentive to petition may be lessened, and first amendment pro-
tections chilled, if successful prayers for government relief and
subsequent conformity to government orders may result in potential an-
titrust liability. Yet this result is necessary, if the Parker immunity is
not to be unwittingly expanded by the defendant's exercise of a first
amendment right in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain true state ac-
tion.' 33 Particularly when, as in Cantor, the state is merely rubber-
stamping essentially private decisionmaking, the mere addition of pri-
vate petitioning for government ratification should not alter the reach of
the antitrust laws. 134
B. Commercial Exceptions
It has been held that the Noerr doctrine does not apply when the
government is engaged in a purely commercial enterprise, or when the
government is acting in a private or proprietary capacity. This excep-
tion is illustrated by George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc.'35 The parties were competitors in the swimming pool
business. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had influenced archi-
tects and city officials, who were drafting details for competitive bid-
ding on municipal pools, to adopt specifications which would favor the
Tex. 1981) (when privately sought governmental actions are tainted by participation of
officials in scheme as co-conspirators, conduct of government itself will be deemed ille-
gal, and in action against both private parties and government, neither defendant is
shielded by either Parker or Noerr doctrine) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 700
F.2d 226, 237 (5th Cir. 1983). But see Ladue Local Lines v. Bi-State Dev. Agency,
433 F.2d 131, 135 (8th Cir. 1970) ("the antitrust laws do not apply to state govern-
ment or activities undertaken pursuant to legislative mandate"; citing, inter alia,
Noerr).
"' See also City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1181 (8th Cir.
1982) (following Cantor); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp.
991, 1021-29 (S.D. Tex. 1981), affd, 700 F.2d 226, 237 (5th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Title Ins. Rating Bureau, 517 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (D. Ariz. 1981).
134 A confusing treatment of the relationship between the Noerr and Parker doc-
trines is found in Brown v: Carr, 1980-1 Trade Cas. 63,033 (D.D.C. 1979). Brown
implied that Noerr protection, as well as Parker protection, might be lost if the govern-
ment's decision for which the defendant had petitioned was not pursuant to a policy of
substituting regulation for competition.
,1 424 F.2d 25, 31-34 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
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defendant or even preclude bidding by competitors. In response to the
assertion that its conduct violated the Sherman Act, the defendant ar-
gued that its solicitation of governmental officials was protected by peti-
tioning immunity. Examining the values implicated by the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine, the First Circuit concluded that it was designed to
allow input on political issues or government policy decisionmaking.' 36
When the government is acting in a proprietary capacity, these con-
cerns are not raised. Furthermore, the modem expansion of the govern-
ment into commercial areas makes it as important to foster competition
here as when the buyers of products are private parties. '37 A similar
limitation on Noerr would apply when the government is acting as the
operator of a commercial venture. Thus, it has been held that the peti-
tioning immunity is not available when an alleged antitrust violation
takes place in connection with the government's leasing of rights at an
airport'38 or a sports stadium.'39
Other cases, however, have rejected a commercial exception. In an-
"' Whitten, 424 F.2d at 32 (exemption applies principally to "an effort to influence
the passage or enforcement of laws"). But cf Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. 65,525, at 68,607 (N.D. I11. 1983) (No-
err applicable to governmental adoption of product standards and building code specifi-
cations); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440, 453 (E.D. Pa.
1966) (activities influencing decisions of public procurement officials constitutionally
protected).
' See City of Atlanta v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. 64,527 (N.D.
Ga. 1981) (immunity unavailable when conspiracy is in connection with city's purchase
of concrete for its own use); General Aircraft Corp. v. Air Am. Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3, 7
(D.D.C. 1979) (Noerr does not apply to "attempts to influence government bodies act-
ing in purely commercial matters such as procurement").
I" Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Fulton County, Ga., 561 F. Supp. 667, 674-76
(N.D. Ga. 1982).
,' Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 940-42 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 556
F. Supp. 664, 668-69 (S.D. Ohio 1983); see also Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park
Dist., 557 F.2d 580, 594 (7th Cir. 1977) (applicability of exemption doubtful when
government is mere lessor of concession rights at municipal golf course), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Vest v. Waring, 565 F. Supp. 674, 687 n.21 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(immunity inapplicable to conspiracy to deny plaintiffs funding by federal National
Eye Institute; Institute decision "to financially underwrite the [defendants'] study
hardly constitutes the type of governmental decision making and policymaking that the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine was designed to protect"); City of Atlanta v. Ashland-War-
ren, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. 64,527 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (doctrine unavailable when city
officials act in commercial rather than policy-making capacity; see supra note 137). But
see Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 1983-2 Trade
Cas. $ 65,525, at 68,607 (N.D. I11. 1983) (Kurek distinguished; inapplicable to govern-
mental adoption of product standards and specifications).
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other decision involving alleged antitrust violations in petitioning the
government regarding its operation of a commercial airport, the Ninth
Circuit held that the Noerr-Pennington objectives of fostering "first
amendment rights and the importance of free-flowing communications
to government decisionmaking [made no distinction between] decisions
implementing rather than formulating policy (sometimes called 'non-
political activity')." 140 Thus, the court concluded that no exception even
for purely commercial concerns was justified.
The balance ought to be struck in favor of some commercial excep-
tion. On the one hand, in Noerr itself, some of the conduct sought by
the defendants was the implementation of conduct - the enforcement
by the executive branch of the laws affecting the trucking industry -
rather than formulation of policy.' Furthermore, in Noerr it was clear
that the railroads were motivated by economic and financial, rather
than political, concerns. 42 The Court nonetheless explicitly recognized
this as a legitimate interest, not susceptible to antitrust scrutiny.'43 On
the other hand, when the government is acting like a private person by
buying a swimming pool or leasing real estate, concerns for enhanced
competition are raised, and political interests are relatively minimal.
Unless there is some public interest to the contrary, application of the
140 In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 693 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3114 (1983); see also Bustop Shelters, Inc. v. Convenience &
Safety Corp., 521 F. Supp. 989, 996 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (questioning commercial
exception).
"' This distinction between formulating and implementing policy was probably in-
correctly applied in Woods Explor. & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d
1286, 1296-98 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972). The defendants
allegedly supplied false information to a state regulatory agency responsible for making
decisions respecting gas and oil drilling rights. As a result, the plaintiff received lower
production allocations than it should have. Although the denial of Noerr-Pennington
immunity might have been appropriate because of the defendants' improper or fraudu-
lent conduct before an administrative agency, see supra notes 77, 104 and accompany-
ing text, the implementation of the policy is not entirely apolitical. Unless the agency
was acting in a purely mechanical fashion, administrative decisions enforcing and im-
plementing laws involve discretion and policymaking. To limit petitioning immunity to
rulemaking or adjudication by administrative agencies, but not to implementation of
existing laws or regulations, is to give California Motor Transp. too narrow a reading.
See also note 56 and accompanying text.
" ' See Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1980)
(exemption also applies when defendant city invokes judicial and administrative
processes to protect its own, and its citizens', economic interests); Huron Valley Hosp.,
Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp 1301, 1312-15 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (same), vacated,
666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981).
"4 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 17:549
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
antitrust laws is appropriate.
C. Government Officials as Co-conspirators1 4 4
Typically, the government officials whose action is sought have little
personal interest in the decision to be made. But if the government offi-
cials have such an interest, and if they take an active part in the defen-
dant's activities or organization, different policy concerns are impli-
cated. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is then no longer simply
shielding private citizens who legitimately attempt to inform the gov-
ernment and participate in the political process; it is also shielding in-
terested government officials and the private individuals or corporations
attempting to co-opt their objectivity. 4" In these circumstances, there is
another exception to the Noerr-Pennington immunity.
The Supreme Court has given little guidance on the extent of this
exception to Noerr-Pennington, merely alluding to its existence in two
opinions.' 4 Some lower court decisions, however, have indicated that
Noerr-Pennington does not apply if the government officials have an
interest in the outcome of the decision sought by the private parties or
profit from it, or take an active role in directing the "conspiracy." '47
Thus, in a case14 8 in which the plaintiff, an unsuccessful applicant for a
municipal cable television franchise, alleged that its successful competi-
tors had conspired with city officials who helped carve up territories
and who led the negotiations among the other applicants, the court
'" It is not clear whether this exception is merely a subspecies of the sham excep-
tion, see generally supra notes 85-121 and accompanying text, or is an entirely separate
exception. See Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991, 1013
n.22 (S.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 700 F.2d 226, 237 (5th Cir. 1983)
(citing cases for both approaches).
' See Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3d Cir. 1975) (if Noerr-
Pennington is inapplicable because government officials are co-conspirators, govern-
ment itself may also be defendant on antitrust claim).
146 In California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513
(1972), the Court said that "[clonspiracy with a licensing authority to eliminate a com-
petitor may also result in an antitrust transgression." In United Mine Workers v. Pen-
nington, 381 U.S. 657, 671 (1965), the Court noted in passing that "the [complained-
of] action ...was the act of a public official who is not claimed to be a co-
conspirator."
"I But see Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, Mo., 693 F.2d 733,
746 (8th Cir. 1982) (criticizing and questioning co-conspirator exception); Metro Cable
Co. v. CATV, 516 F.2d 220, 229-31 (7th Cir. 1975) (same); Cow Palace, Ltd. v.
Associated Milk Producers, 390 F. Supp. 696, 704-05 (D. Colo. 1975) (same).
,48 Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991, 1012-23 (S.D.
Tex. 1981), affd, 700 F.2d 226, 237 (5th Cir. 1983) (dictum).
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found "more than mere acquiescence in private conspirators' plans or
mere support of private parties' efforts to induce favorable legislative
results." '49 This conclusion resulted in a loss of Noerr-Pennington im-
munity. Similarly, in other cases in which government officials have
taken an active role in setting up or implementing the allegedly unlaw-
ful anticompetitive combination, full application of the antitrust laws
has been held appropriate. 5 '
On the other hand, the mere interest of the government officials in
the outcome of the decisionmaking process, whether that interest is po-
litical or economic, is not enough to cause loss of petitioning immu-
nity. 5 ' It is not improper for government officials to have a policy bias,
and thus to be affirmatively interested in seeing certain private propos-
als enacted or implemented as government policy. In fact, Noerr-Pen-
nington will apply even if the officials receive campaign contributions
or certain other benefits from the private citizens requesting relief.'52
Immunity is lost only when the officials actively participate in the
underlying conspiracy, yet the line certainly is not a clear one. In one
sense, by adopting the policy or undertaking the conduct sought by the
,' 519 F. Supp. at 1016.
110 See, e.g., Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3d Cir. 1975); Harman
v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1964), questioned and limited in
Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341, 342-43 (9th Cir.
1969); Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharm. Ass'n, 484 F. Supp. 1195,
1202-04, 1209 (D.D.C. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part, 663 F.2d 253, 267 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason
City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 745 (N.D. Iowa 1979) (question of fact); see also Kurek v.
Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated and re-
manded, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), reinstated, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Israel v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 274-80 & n.la (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Campbell v. City of Chicago, 577 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D. Iii. 1983).
"'t Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharm. Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253, 264
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Hopkinsville Cable TV, Inc. v.
Pennyroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 543, 547 (W.D. Ky. 1982); Huron Valley
Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301, 1314-15 (E.D. Mich. 1979), va-
cated, 666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981); Sims v. Tinney, 482 F. Supp. 794, 801 (D.S.C.
1977); Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, 390 F. Supp. 696, 704-05 (D.
Colo. 1975); Independent Taxicab Operators' Ass'n v. Yellow Cab Co., 278 F. Supp.
979, 985 (N.D. Cal. 1968); see also First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title
Ass'n, 714 F.2d 1439, 1445-46 (8th Cir. 1983) (participation of state agency, with
private parties, in lobbying for new legislation not actionable conspiracy), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 709 (1984).
152 Metro Cable Co. v. CATV, 516 F.2d 220, 230-31 (7th Cir. 1975); Cow Palace,
Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, 390 F. Supp. 696, 704-05 (D. Colo. 1975).
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private party, the officials participate in every conspiracy.153 Thus, the
appropriate criteria in determining whether Noerr-Pennington applies
would be whether the government officials also take part in the prelim-
inary steps prior to the implementation of the conspiracy, and whether
the officials act in an essentially private capacity while wearing a "gov-
ernment hat."' 5
D. Miscellaneous Issues Under Noerr-Pennington
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine has spawned a number of decisions
on peripheral issues. For example, although petitions for legislative re-
lief cannot form the basis of antitrust liability, may documents sur-
rounding requests for proposed legislation be obtained during pre-trial
discovery in connection with litigation based on other substantive theo-
ries? Rejecting the argument that allowing such discovery would have
an additional chilling effect on political activities, one court has held
that Noerr-Pennington states a defense to an antitrust claim, but that
the petitioning process does not involve privileged conduct within the
meaning of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55 and hence is discov-
erable. 56 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine has been held to be constitu-
,53 Metro Cable Co. v. CATV, 516 F.2d 220, 230 (7th Cir. 1975); see also Hospital
Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678, 687-88 (4th Cir. 1982) (mere par-
ticipation as part of duties by government official not enough to make her contributor
to illegal conspiracy), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 259 (1983); Miller & Son Paving v.
Wrightstown Township Civic Ass'n, 443 F. Supp. 1268, 1272 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (allega-
tion that government is part of conspiracy insufficient to state antitrust cause of action
when defendant's political activities are essentially noncommercial), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 843 (1979).
I" Cf Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543-46
(5th Cir. 1978) (exemption buttressed when petitioning defendants are acting as agents
of state or are following state commands), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
The application of the co-conspirator exception, except perhaps in very rare situa-
tions, is criticized in Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government
Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Cm. L. REV.
80, 114-15 (1977).
"5 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
"' North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 666
F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1981). The genesis of this treatment of evidence of communications as
admissible for limited purposes is a footnote in Pennington:
It would of course still be within the province of the trial judge to admit
this evidence, if he deemed it probative and not unduly prejudicial, under
the "established judicial rule of evidence that testimony of prior or subse-
quent transactions, which for some reason are [sic] barred from forming
the basis for a suit, may nevertheless be introduced if it tends reasonably
to show the purpose and character of the particular transactions under
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tionally grounded, so that petitioning immunity would extend to a
claim brought under a state antitrust law, as well as a claim under the
federal Sherman or Clayton Acts.157
Finally, it should be emphasized that the possibility of petitioning
immunity under Noerr-Penninglon is a separate and distinct issue from
the underlying antitrust liability. Although a combination of persons
might lose the immunity for any of the reasons described above, the
plaintiff must prove separately all the elements of the substantive anti-
trust violation. The absence of petitioning immunity merely allows the
court to proceed to the merits of the action.58
CONCLUSION
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine attempts to reconcile the sometimes
conflicting goals of the antitrust laws, which seek to stimulate competi-
tion, with political and constitutional norms, which seek to protect free-
scrutiny."
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670 n.3 (quoting Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333
U.S. 683, 705 (1948) (citations omitted)); see also Associated Container Transp. (Aus-
tralia) Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1983) (Noerr doctrine does
not preclude enforcement of Antitrust Division Civil Investigative Demand respecting
communications with federal administrative agency). But see Australia/Eastern U.S.A.
Shipping Conference v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 807 (D.D.C. 1982) (first amend-
ment interests protected by Noerr justify quashing of Antitrust Division Civil Investiga-
tive Demand when government made only limited showing of need); cf Alexander v.
National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1196 (8th Cir. 1982) (evidence of communica-
tions with government not basis of antitrust liability but evidence of "purpose and char-
acter" of defendant's activities in other transactions), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2108
(1983); Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543 n.7
(5th Cir. 1978) (evidence of protected petitioning admissible only when defendant's first
amendment interests not prejudiced), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Lamb Enter. v.
Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506, 515-16 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001
(1972); Household Goods Carriers' Bureau v. Terrell, 452 F.2d 152, 158, 161 (5th
Cir. 1971) (same); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 538 F. Supp.
1257, 1274-79 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (evidence of communications between defendant and
municipal officials inadmissible as substantially prejudicial and nonprobative); Schenley
Indus. v. New Jersey Wine & Spirit Wholesalers Ass'n, 272 F. Supp. 872, 886-87
(D.N.J. 1967).
' Suburban Restoration Co. v. Acmat Corp., 700 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1983); Pennwalt
Corp. v. Zenith Labs., Inc. 472 F. Supp. 413, 423-24 (E.D. Mich. 1979), appeal dis-
missed, 615 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1980); Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 936-39
(N.D. Cal. 1972).
"' Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240,
1259 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983); George R. Whitten, Jr.,
Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, 424 F.2d 25, 34 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850
(1970).
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dom of speech, press, and assembly and to guarantee public access to
governmental officials. The two United States Supreme Court decisions
which created the Noerr-Pennington doctrine articulated a strong bias
toward the latter constitutional values. Because of the broad strokes
typical of Supreme Court decisions, many issues were raised but left
unresolved.
Subsequent lower court decisions have sought to fill in the gaps and
to tip the balance in favor of the objectives of the antitrust laws. This
Article has identified some open areas of inquiry, and suggested why
many of these questions should be resolved by emphasizing pro-compet-
itive objectives. It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will deal with
these issues in the near future, availing itself of the opportunity to en-
courage vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws, even when political
concerns are involved.

